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CAN DEFENDANTS USE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE TO
BUY OFF CLASS ACTIONS?
The class action suit authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23'
provides a means by which many small claims, not worthy of individual
pursuit, may be joined and vindicated in one suit. Class actions avoid
multiple litigation and thereby reduce congestion in the courts. By avoid-
ing multiple lawsuits, parties opposing classes are not subjected to the
possibility of different, inconsistent standards of action resulting from
numerous adverse judgments. 2 The "case or controversy" clause3 of Article
I The prerequisites to bringing a Rule 23 class action are that joinder of all members of
the class is impracticable, that there are questions of law or fact common to all members of
the class, that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the class,
and that the representatives can adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a). The class action is maintainable only if separate adjudications might establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the defendants, or a judgment in one action would determine
as a practical matter the rights of all members of the class, or the party opposing the class
has acted in such a manner as to make classwide injunctive relief necessary, or the common
questions of law or fact predominate over any individual questions so that a class action is
superior to separate adjudications. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The rule also provides procedural
details relating to certification, notice, binding effects of judgments, and dismissals. Fm. R.
Civ. P. 23(c), (d), & (e).
See note 1 supra. See generally 3B MooE's FEDERAL PRACxCE 23.02 at 23-71 (2d ed.
1976); Comment, Federal Appellate Review of the Grant or Denial of Class Action Status,
18 B.C. L. REV. 101 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Appellate Review]. Commentators on Rule
23 have argued that the class action is a plaintiff-oriented remedy which promotes the public
interest. See Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Precertification Stage: Is Notice
Required?, 56 N.C. L. REv. 303, 303 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Almond]; Kane, Standing,
Mootness, and Federal Rule 2-Balancing Perspectives, 26 BursAo L. REv. 83, 91 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Kane].
Several recent Supreme Court decisions have limited class actions. These cases illustrate
that specific procedural requirements must be followed strictly by all litigants in class ac-
tions. In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the Court held that when the plaintiff asserts
diversity of citizenship as the jurisdictional basis, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), courts must apply
the general rule as to aggregation of separate and distinct claims. The general rule is that
each plaintiff joining in the action must exert a claim in excess of $10,000, as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). The Court held that the members of the class must each have a
$10,000 claim. 394 U.S. at 336. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.'291 (1973), the
Court, relying on Snyder, ruled that even where named plaintiffs satisfied the amount in
controversy requirement, the unnamed class members' claims of less than $10,000 could not
be joined with those of the named plaintiffs. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), the Court ruled that the class representatives must bear the expense of providing
notice of the class action, as required by Rule 23(c)(2), to the unnamed class members
regardless of the size of the class. This notice requirement renders many class actions, for
economic reasons, impossible for the small claimant to maintain. See generally Jacoby &
Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN
Diaco L. Rav. 1 (1974); 53 N.C. L. Rev. 409 (1974). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978) (denial of class certification not appealable as collateral order; specific
disapproval of the "death knell" doctrine); see note 66 infra.
Although the Supreme Court has required strict adherence to the statutory procedure
governing class actions, the appealability of a grant or denial of class certification is not
controlled by a specific statutory rule. The Court has taken a more flexible and equitable
approach to the question of appealability. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S.
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III section 2 of the Constitution limits class actions by requiring that a live
controversy exist between the parties to a lawsuit. The case or controversy
requirement manifests itself in the mootness doctrine,4 which dictates that
when a party to a suit no longer has a stake in the outcome of the litigation,
no controversy is present and the action must be dismissed. A certified
class action, however, may proceed in some cases even after the class
representative's claim is mooted, if a live controversy still exists between
the unnamed class members and the opposing party.6
Recently, two circuit courts have reached opposite conclusions as to the
impact of the case or controversy clause on uncertified class actions
brought under Rule 23.' In Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings and Loan
385 (1977). In McDonald, the Court allowed an unnamed member of the putative class to
intervene after a final judgment for the purpose of appealing the denial of class certification,
although such intervention did not immediately seem timely and circumvented the statute
of limitations. 432 U.S. at 391-94. The McDonald decision indicates that the issue of class
certification is different from other issues upon which the Court has limited class actions. The
Snyder and Zahn decisions may be characterized as part of the Court's movement to limit
diversity jurisdiction, not class actions. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969); 39
Mo. L. REv. 447, 447 (1974).
3 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity ... ;-to Contro-
versies . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The case or controversy clause requires that a real,
adversary conflict be present before the court. The requirement limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to cases presented in an adversary context capable of judicial resolution and
insures that courts will not intrude into areas reserved to other branches of government. Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
Mootness occurs when the plaintiff's claim ceases to exist either through passage of
time, by operation of law, or by satisfaction. A plaintiff whose claim is mooted has no further
stake in the controversy, since a favorable decision will not benefit him. Thus, no live case
or controversy exists. Mootness, a traditional common law doctrine, was first given constitu-
tional status as part of the case or controversy requirement by the Supreme Court in Liner
v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). See generally Note, The Mootness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. Rnv. 373, 375 n.12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mootness
Doctrine].
5 Rule 23(c)(1) provides that "[als soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained." FaD. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
6 See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In these cases, the Court allowed the
class action to continue despite the mootness of the named plaintiffs' claims because a
sufficient controversy still existed between the unnamed class members and the defendants.
See notes 24 & 25 infra.
' Compare Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979) (post-mootness review of denial of class certification
allowed) with Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271, rehearing denied, 562
F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (post-mootness review of denial
of class certification not allowed). See also Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1978) cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1978) (claims were nearly
capable of repetition yet evading review; court did not wish to insulate denial of certification
from review; adversity of suit continued by virtue of efforts of attorneys; facts were consistent
across class; review allowed); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1977) (denial not reviewable generally); Banks v. Multi-Family Mgt., Inc., 554 F.2d 127 (4th
Cir. 1977) (court refused to review); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
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Association,I the Seventh Circuit held that the district court properly dis-
missed as moot a case in which class action certification was denied and
defendants thereafter tendered the damages individually claimed-by the
named plaintiffs. The tender of damages mooted the named plaintiffs'
claims and, due to the denial of certification, the claims of the unnamed
class members were not before the court. Mootness precluded appellate
review of the denial of class certification.' In a similar case, Roper v.
Consurve, Inc.,"0 the Fifth Circuit held that the named plaintiffs could
appeal the denial of certification after defendants had tendered damages
and judgment was entered for plaintiffs."
In Winokur, depositors filed a class action against their savings and
loan associations that charged false advertising of interest computing
methods in violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.I2 The district court declined to certify the action as a class ac-
tion.13 The plaintiffs failed to obtain review of the denial of certification
as either a reviewable interlocutory order 4 or a final order. 5 The defen-
dants then tendered the claimed damages to the named plaintiffs and
corrected the interest crediting practices to conform to the advertising. 6
The district court declared that the plaintiffs no longer had a stake in any
controversy before the court and dismissed the action for mootness.'7 The
plaintiffs sought review in the circuit court of both the dismissal and the
order denying class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding
of mootness and, thus, had no jurisdiction to review the denial of certifica-
tion due to the absence of a live controversy. 8 As a result of the Winokur
decision, defendants may buy off 9 class actions by tendering damages to
denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (review available where claim "capable of repetition yet evading
review").
1 560 F.2d 271, rehearing denied, 562 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1978), noted 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 811 (1977).
I d. at 276.
10 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979).
" Id. at 1110-11.
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). The plaintiffs in Winokur sought
damages, a permanent injunction against the false advertising, and attorneys' fees. 560 F.2d
at 272.
11 Id. at 273. In denying certification, the court found that the questions of fact varied
on an individual basis. Id.
" Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), some interlocutory orders may be appealed at the
discretion of the trial and appellate courts. See note 67 infra.
" 560 F.2d at 274. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) authorizes appeal of final orders.
" 560 F.2d at 275.
" Id. at 274. Plaintiffs also claimed attorneys' fees although they conceded no statutory
authorization for such an award exists. The court held that there was no equitable theory
under which attorneys' fees could be awarded. Thus the claim for attorneys' fees could not
provide the plaintiffs with a stake in the controversy. Id. at 275.
" The court held that, absent a live controversy, an appellate court cannot exercise
jurisdiction to reverse the certification determination and create a live controversy. Id. at 276.
' A "buy-off" of a class action occurs when the defendant tenders to the named plaintiff
his individually claimed damages, the plaintiff rejects the tender, and the defendant subse-
19791
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the named plaintiffs and thereby escape classwide liability. 0
In reaching its conclusion, the Winokur court relied on several recent
Supreme Court decisions" which considered whether a class action may
continue after the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. In the decisions
relied upon in Winokur,"2 whether the district court has certified the class
action has been a central factor in determining whether the class has
"acquired a legal status separate from the interests" of the named plain-
tiffs and thus can survive the mooting of the named plaintiffs' claims. In
Sosna v. Iowau and Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 5 the class
actions were certified under Rule 23 and the named plaintiffs' claims later
became moot. The Court held that a live controversy still existed between
the unnamed class members and the defendants. The class actions were
allowed to continue for appellate review of the merits of each case."
quently moves successfully for dismissal of the action for mootness. The defendant thus
escapes any further liability in the action. A buy-off is distinguishable from settlement be-
cause the plaintiff acquiesces in settlement. "Buy-off" does not mean that the defendant has
acted in bad faith. A defendant generally has the right to terminate litigation by satisfying
the claims made against him. An effort to escape liability is justifiable as a good business
decision which, if lawful, should not be criticized. Any negative connotation of the term "buy-
off" should be limited to the suggestion that the possibility of buy-off produces an undesirable
result where the prosecution of classwide claims is forestalled.
21 See Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 562 F.2d 1034, 1034 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Swygert, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
21 560 F.2d at 276-77, citing, inter alia, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420
U.S. 128 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
,1 See note 21 supra.
z Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
419 U.S. 393 (1975). In Sosna, the plaintiff challenged Iowa's one year residency re-
quirement for divorce actions. Id. at 396. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the
named plaintiff had obtained a divorce in another state and had resided in Iowa for over one
year. Id. at 399. Therefore, her claim was moot. Iowans of less than a year's residency might,
however, still have been affected by the allegedly unconstitutional statute. Thus, a live
controversy continued to exist between the unnamed class members and the defendant.
Because a live controversy continued to exist, the Court allowed the class challenge of the
statute to proceed with the named plaintiff remaining as representative. Id. at 403.
2 424 U.S. 747 (1976). In Franks, plaintiffs filed a class action alleging racially discrimi-
natory employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e et seq. (1976). 424 U.S. at 750-51. The subsequent hiring of the class representative by
the defendant mooted the representative's individual claim. Id. at 752. The Court nonetheless
allowed the class action to proceed because sufficient controversy existed with respect to the
unnamed class members' claims for relief from discriminatory employment practices. Id. at
755-57.
11 Sosna dealt with a constitutional challenge to a state statute. The Sosna court applied
the "capable of repetition yet evading review" standard in finding a live controversy sufficient
to satisfy the case or controversy requirement. 419 U.S. at 401-03. This standard provides that
where the intervening mootness of plaintiff's claims repeatedly prevents the litigation of
important federal claims, thus preventing judicial review, appellate review will not be denied
on the basis of mootness. Id. at 401-02 & n.9. See also Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 514-16 (1911) (first statement by the Court of the repetition/evasion standard).
The Sosna court noted that the repetition/evasion standard did not detract from the case or
controversy requirement so long as the named plaintiff had a claim at the time the complaint
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The Supreme Court also considered the importance of Rule 23 certifica-
tion in Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs2l and Weinstein v.
Bradford.21 In these cases, class actions were not certified and the court
found the claims of the named plaintiffs moot. 9 In both Jacobs and
Bradford, the party opposing the class sought review of an adverse decision
on the merits of the case. Since the party opposing the class had no reason
to complain of a denial of certification, that question was not raised on
appeal in either Bradford or Jacobs. The Court had no opportunity to
consider whether the denial could have been reviewed.
After analyzing the four Supreme Court decisions, the Winokur court
stated a rule based on the lack of certification in Bradford and Jacobs:
When there is no determination that an action be maintained as
was filed and a live controversy continued to exist as to the unnamed class members' claims,
regardless of the status of the named plaintiff's claim. 419 U.S. at 402. Franks expanded the
situations in which a class action could continue after the named plaintiff's claim became
moot. Franks involved employment practices prohibited by federal statutes. The Court noted
that "capable of repetition yet evading review" was not a condition for allowing the case to
continue, because the repetitioi/evasion test is part of the mootness doctrine only as it
applies to constitutional issues. 424 U.S. at 756 n.8. Since no constitutional issues were pre-
sented in Winokur, the court did not consider the "capable of repetition yet evading review"
test.
t 420 U.S. 128 (1975). Students brought a class action charging violations of First
Amendment rights in connection with an underground newspaper. The circuit court affirmed
a judgment for the students. 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), aff'g 349 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind.
1972). By the time the Supreme Court reviewed the case, the newspaper had ceased publica-
tion and the named plaintiffs had graduated. Although the district court treated the action
as a class action, the court made only an informal class certification which did not comply
with the requirements of Rule 23. The only notation of record which referred to the suit as a
class action was in the reported opinion of the district court's judgment, wherein the court
held that the plaintiffs "qualified as proper representatives of the class whose interest they
seek to protect." 420 U.S. at 130, citing 349 F. Supp. at 611. The Supreme Court held that
this informal certification was equivalent to no certification. Absent certification, the class
claims could not survive the mootness of the named plaintiffs' claims and the Court dismissed
the entire case. 420 U.S. at 130. Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the Jacobs certification
was no less formal than the Sosna certification. Id. at 132.
Although class certification was imperfect in Jacobs, it certainly was not denied by the
district court. The record indicates that the district court, the class, the named plaintiffs,
and the defendants treated the case as a class action. See 420 U.S. at 129-31; 349 F. Supp.
at 611. The named plaintiffs could not raise the issue of a denial of class certification for
review in the Supreme Court. Certification was decided, if at all, in their favor in the district
court. See 420 U.S. at 129. The school board, in its petition for certiorari, did not challenge
certification of the class, but challenged the substance of the lower court's finding of a First
Amendment violation. 42 U.S.L.W. 3546 (No. 73-1347). The mootness question, which led to
the examination of the propriety of class certification, was raised first at oral argument before
the Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at 130.
21 423 U.S. 147 (1975). Bradford, a North Carolina prisoner, brought a class action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of parole board procedures. The district court denied class action
certification and Bradford continued his suit individually. Id. After the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review a decision favorable to Bradford, he completed his sentence and
was released from custody. Id. Bradford himself moved for dismissal on the ground of moot-
ness. Id. at 147-48. The Court held Bradford's claim moot, and, in the absence of class
certification, dismissed the action. Id. at 148.
29 420 U.S. at 129; 423 U.S. at 149.
1979]
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a class action and the controversy between the named party in his
own interest and his opponent dies, court adjudication is not ap-
propriate because there is no controversy between the parties who
are present or represented before the court in the action."0
Applying this rule to the facts, the Winokur court held that lack of jurisdic-




The Winokur court saw no difference between review of the procedural
question of denial of certification" and the review on the merits sought by
opponents of the class in Jacobs and Bradford. Yet such a distinction is
critical to the analysis of appealability.13 In Bradford, the plaintiff's claims
were properly held moot. If Bradford had been allowed to prevail on the
merits after his release from custody, the Court could only have decided
that the parole board could not use its unconstitutional procedures in
considering Bradford's parole. Such relief could not benefit Bradford after
his release and would benefit no others since class certification had been
denied. Thus, the basis for the mootness doctrine, that courts will not
waste time reaching decisions where no relief can be granted, applied in
Bradford.
Since the denial of certification was not raised on appeal in Jacobs and
Bradford, the Winokur court's reliance on those cases was unnecessary.
Moreover, the Sosna and Franks decisions focused on the merits of the
actions and the effects of mootness rather than on the issue of certification.
Class certification was not essential to the appealability of those cases
since they involved properly certified class actions.3 4 Thus, for the limited
1 560 F.2d at 277. But see Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Seventh Circuit in Susman limited the Winokur rule to cases where the district court
has denied certification. See text accompanying notes 69-95 infra.
11 560 F.2d at 277.
2 The question of class certification has been treated as a procedural matter for purposes
of denying immediate appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). See Jenkins v. Blue
Cross Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235, 1237, rehearing 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); note 66 infra.
1 The Second and Third Circuits have recognized the distinction between appeal of a
denial of class certification and appeal of the merits of the action. In Lasky v. Quinlan, 558
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977), the court held that a belated certification occurring after mootness
cannot relate back to the filing of the complaint, see note 41 infra, where the district court
"expressly denied class certification and there was no appeal from that determination." Id.
at 1136 (emphasis added). In Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. granted 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979), the court distinguished Bradford
and Jacobs from the case under review on the ground that review of the denial of certification
was not sought in those cases. Id. at 249 n.43 and 250 n.48.
1 But see Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 132 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas argued that the certification in Sosna was not wholly proper.
Id. See also Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238, 249 n.43 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979), ("certified" in Sosna should be read
as "certifiable").
Courts have recognized a presumption of class action status at the precertification stage.
See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal 'of the
Class Representative, 1974 DuKE L. J. 573. If a complaint filed as a class action is entitled to
[Vol. XXXVI
CLASS ACTIONS
purpose of allowing such an appeal after mootness, the requirement that
there exist a certified class action should not apply when the denial of
certification is the issue raised on appeal. In determining justiciability, the
critical issue is not certification, but the existence of a live controversy.
In a case such as Winokur, both the putative class members and the
named plaintiffs have a stake in the review of the denial of certification
despite mootness of the named plaintiffs' claims. Unnamed class members
retain an interest in the vindication of their claims. Although the Winokur
court found no live controversy," depositors who may have relied to their
detriment on the alleged false advertising still had claims they could bring
against the defendant. The denial of certification was a procedural ruling
which did not eliminate the claims of the other depositors. If that denial
was error, the unnamed depositors' claims were wrongly denied considera-
tion. Although the court said it could not "instill a live controversy into
the action""6 by reviewing the denial of certification, it might have uncov-
ered a live controversy present from the time the action was filed.
Even if the damage claims of the unnamed class members are not
before the court absent certification, the class action certification question
itself could provide the requisite live controversy. Unnamed class members
would benefit from a reversal of the denial of certification since such a
ruling would bring their damage claims one step closer to vindication.
Either the damage claims of the class or the certification question could
provide the live controversy required by Sosna and Franks.37
such a presumption for certain purposes, and one of those purposes is to determine the
certifiability of the class, class action status could be presumed for the narrow purpose of
reviewing the denial of certification. See id. at 576; cf. Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587
F.2d 866, 869 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978) (recognizes the stated argument but neither relies on nor
adopts it).
560 F.2d at 277.
Id. at 276.
A claim for attorneys' fees might also provide the vehicle to avoid dismissal for moot-
ness. Such a claim could provide the requisite live controversy. The Winokur court reviewed
this claim and found that the plaintiffs could not recover attorneys' fees under a theory that
defendants had acted in bad faith or under the common fund rule. 560 F.2d at 275. The
common fund rule provides that where plaintiff recovers a fund for the benefit of a group, he
may recover attorneys' fees from the fund. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
167 (1939). The rationale for the rule is that unjust enrichment results where others benefit
without contributing to the plaintiff's litigation expenses. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 392 (1970). See also Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (first Supreme
Court decision recognizing the common fund rule).
The plaintiffs' common fund argument in Winokur asserted that defendant's revision of
the interest crediting practice conferred a benefit on the unnamed class members for which
plaintiffs should recover attorneys' fees. The court held that the defendant might just as
easily have revised the advertising so as to avoid misleading the depositors, while the interest
rate would have remained the same. 560 F.2d at 275. Nonetheless, assuming that the litiga-
tion was the cause of the revision of the interest crediting practice, the unnamed depositors
benefitted from litigation financed entirely by the named plaintiffs.
If defendant's conduct involves bad faith, attorneys' fees can be awarded under the bad
faith rule. See F.D. Rich. Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974). Even if the named plaintiff's damage claims are mooted, the bad faith allegations in
the complaint should keep the claim for attorneys' fees sufficiently alive to present the
1979]
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Moreover, the named plaintiff retains an interest in the prosecution of
the class action despite the mooting of his individual claim. By filing a
class action, the named plaintiff has held himself forth as the representa-
tive of the class and has accepted a fiduciary responsibility to the class.3 8
As a fiduciary, the named plaintiff is obligated to press the claims of the
class.39 Although his individual claims have been satisfied, the plaintiff's
duty and desire to promote the claims of the class present an interest in
the review of the denial of certification which satisfies the case or contro-
versy requirement. Thus, the named plaintiff and unnamed putative class
members benefit from review of the denial of certification. If the denial is
reversed, the class action can proceed to decision on the merits under the
Sosna-Franks rule which permits a class action to continue despite moot-
ness of the named plaintiffs claims. 0
In dictum in Sosna, the Supreme Court suggested an additional means
of satisfying the case or controversy requirement. The Court postulated an
exception to the requirement that a certified class action must exist for the
purpose of an appeal after the named plaintiffs claims are mooted."1 If
mootness occurs before the district court rules on certification of the class
action, a subsequent certification may relate back to the time of filing the
complaint. The exception has been applied where the district court de-
layed in making the certification decision.42 The language of the exception
requisite controversy. Thus the defendant whose conduct involves bad faith will be unable
to escape classwide liability by buying off the plaintiff. In Winokur, however, the court found
nothing in the record to support a bad faith argument. 560 F.2d at 275. Where the plaintiff
had pleaded bad faith or has offered evidence tending to prove it, the attorneys' fees claim
could survive the mootness of plaintiff's other claims.
Either the common fund rule or the existence of bad faith behavior will support a claim
for attorneys' fees as a live controversy sufficient to prevent mootness. Such claims would
give the circuit court appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of class certification.
' See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d
209, 219 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), affl'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978); LaSala v. Ameri-
can Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal.3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). The Roper
court held that the named plaintiffs assumed responsibilities to the members of the putative
class by the very act of filing a class action. Those responsibilities could not be terminated
by taking satisfaction, voluntarily or involuntarily, of the claims. 578 F.2d at 1110. The
implication is that the named plaintiffs have an unqualified duty to appeal the denial of
certification.
31 Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979); see note 38 supra.
o See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
419 U.S. at 402 n.11. While stating that class certification would be necessary to avoid
a finding of mootness, the Sosna court noted:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plaintiffs is
such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably be
expected to rule on a certification motion. In such instances, whether the certifica-
tion can be said to "relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend upon
the circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that
otherwise the issue would evade review.
Id. (emphasis added).
11 See, e.g., Basel v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395, 397 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (insufficient time for
certification by district court); Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
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indicates that it applies only to precertification mootness rather than to
mootness arising after denial of certification. However, it seems unreasona-
ble to say that where the district court is merely slow, relation back of class
certification will be allowed, but where the district court erroneously de-
nies certification, relation back will not be allowed. Relation back should
be permitted in the case of a post-denial mootness. Recently, the Seventh
Circuit has applied the Sosna relation back exception to a case where the
named plaintiff's claims were mooted before the district court had ruled
on certification. 3
The Winokur court relied on Sosna but gave no consideration to rela-
tion back, which might have produced a different result." The rule of
Jacobs and Bradford can be limited on the facts of those cases to allow no
review of the merits of a mooted case where class certification is denied
and the denial is not raised on appeal. Sosna does not foreclose the review
of the denial after the named plaintiff's claims become moot, either be-
cause the Sosna requirement of certification does not apply where review
of that question is sought or because Sosna makes possible a relation back
of certification where the denial is reversed on appeal." Winokur was de-
cided improperly insofar as the court relied on the lack of certification
distinction between Sosna-Franks and Jacobs-Bradford.
In addition to improperly analyzing Supreme Court decisions applying
the mootness doctrine to uncertified class actions, the Winokur court ig-
433 U.S. 914 (1977) (district court delayed in ruling on certification).
- Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1978). See text accompany-
ing notes 69-95 infra.
1 See note 43 supra. Several other cases have allowed relation back of certification. See,
e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (the class existed continuously, but no single
member ever remained in the class long enough to have its claims adjudicated; reliance on
Sosna exception); Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979) (see text accompanying notes 49-66 infra; no reliance
on Sosna exception); Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979) (denial reviewable; mention of Sosna
exception, but no reliance); Basel v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (insufficient time
for certification by district court; partial reliance on Sosna exception); Zurak v. Regan, 550
F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977) (district court delayed in ruling on
certification; reliance on Sosna exception); Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.
1976) (claims for welfare payments were of "emergency" nature; reliance on Sosna exception).
See also Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (courts recognized their power to review
a denial of class certification after mootness and relate that certification back, but declined
to do so).
Of these cases, only Roper and Susman involved what appeared to be a buy-off attempt.
See note 43 supra. The purpose of relation back is applicable to the buy-off situation since
no single plaintiff can ever remain in the class long enough to have the claims of the class
adjudicated if the defendant continues to buy off the named plaintiffs one at a time.
41 See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979). The Geraghty court considered both the
relation back theory of Sosna and a theory that prior certification was unnecessary to review
of the certification question. The court stated that relation back is merely a legal fiction and
analyzed the denial of certification problem in terms of an exception to general mootness
doctrine. Id. at 249 n.45 & 250-52; see note 33 supra.
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nored strong policy considerations in favor of allowing review of the denial
of certification." Although the court attempted to accommodate the con-
stitutional requirement of the case or controversy clause, the result in
Winokur impairs the class action as an effective means of vindicating
numerous small claims. A defendant can escape classwide liability, not on
the merits, but by tendering damages to the named representatives" and
thus depriving the court of jurisdiction to consider the class action. As a
matter of public policy, courts should be reluctant to apply a standard of
justiciability which is so restrictive that a defendant can buy off a class
action by immunizing from review a denial of class action certification.
The policies militating against this result fall into two groups: policies
promoting class actions as an effective means of vindicating numerous
small claims and protecting unnamed class members," and policies involv-
ing the scope of appellate review.
The Fifth Circuit, in Roper v. Consurve, Inc.,4" recently considered such
policy arguments and held that a denial of certification may be reviewed
subsequent to the mooting of the named plaintiffs' claims. 5 Holders of
Bankamericards brought a class action charging the issuing bank with
11 Policy considerations apply to both the desirability of class actions and the application
of the mootness doctrine. The doctrine, as applied in Winokur, creates the undesirable effect
of allowing defendants with actual liability to escape by satisfying only a relatively small
number of claims.
Strict application of the mootness doctrine may be neither necessary nor desirable in
class actions. Kane, supra note 2, at 84. The requirements of Rule 23 regulate the same kinds
of questions as does the mootness doctrine, e.g. that the adversary suit is really in the interest
of the class and that the plaintiff is a proper representative. Id. at 109-10. Dismissing class
actions for mootness applies the doctrine in such a way as to promote judicial diseconomy.
Litigation of all the claims of the proposed class in one action is more efficient than a series
of dismissals followed by new actions. The result in Winokur contravenes the policy of avoid-
ing a multiplicity of suits. See generally Mootness Doctrine, supra note 4, at 376; Comment,
Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class
Representative, 1974 DUKE L. J. 573 (while class certification is the primary line of demarca-
tion in determining whether the class action should be allowed to continue, an exception
should be made where the defendant might evade justice). A defendant who has actual
liability to a class evades justice when he can buy off the class action, preclude appellate
review of an improper denial of certification, and escape classwide liability.
The chief issues in Winokur and Roper are the mootness doctrine and its effect, which
are often controlled by policy issues. Mootness Doctrine, supra note 4, at 378. But see Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). The Livesay Court held policy arguments irrele-
vant in the decision to overrule the "death knell" doctrine, note 66 infra. However, the issue
in Livesay involved interlocutory appeal of the denial of class certification. The disfavor with
which courts look on interlocutory appeals is much stronger than any reluctance to adjust
the mootness doctrine.
"7 The amount of damages claimed and tendered in Winokur was approximately $12.00.
560 F.2d at 274.
,' Rule 23(e) protects the unnamed class members by providing that a certified class
action cannot be dismissed or settled without leave of court and notification of the unnamed
class members.




usury." The district court denied class action certification.2 The defen-
dant then tendered the amounts of the named plaintiffs' individual dam-
age claims. 3 Although the plaintiffs never accepted the tender, judgment
for plaintiffs was entered over plaintiffs' objection. 4
The Roper court did not consider the Supreme Court's decisions in
Sosna, Franks, Jacobs, or Bradford. Instead of analyzing the existing case
law, the Roper court stated the undesirability of a rule that precludes
review of the denial of class certification.55 Recognizing a number of options
open to plaintiff classes in other situations, the court found no reason to
preclude appeal of the denial of certification by the named plaintiffs." The
court emphasized "the judicial responsibility to ensure that class repre-
sentatives adequately represent the interests of the class."5' 7 The Fifth
Circuit has stated several reasons why named plaintiffs should be allowed
to appeal the denial of certification. The record of the certification hearing
makes review of the denial possible with no need for speculation as to the
facts concerning certification. Also, the plaintiff bears no responsibility for
the error below.58 The Roper court particularly noted that the denial of
certification would escape review under a strict application of the mootness
doctrine. The court found no conflict with the case or controversy require-
ment by holding that a viable controversy existed with respect to the
certification question itself. The problem then became one of standing, not
mootness. The court stated that the named plaintiffs retained a stake in
the litigation because of their refusal of tendered damages and their inter-
est in obtaining classwide relief.60 Thus the case or controversy requirement
was satisfied. Although the court did not analyze Sosna or related cases, a
holding that the certification question is sufficient controversy is not in-
consistent with the Sosna-Franks rule that a class action can continue after
named plaintiff's claims are mooted, provided that a live controversy re-
mains between the unnamed class members and the defendants. On the
basis of the certification controversy, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial
of class action certification.




" Id. at 1110. The court observed that the notion that a defendant may "short circuit"
a class action by buying off named plaintiffs deserved "short shrift." Few class actions could
survive such buy-offs. Id.
578 F.2d at 1110-11. The Roper court noted that putative class members have been
allowed t6 intervene and appeal the denial of certification after named plaintiffs lost on the
merits. Id. at 1110. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). The Roper
court also observed that the named plaintiff could appeal a denial of certification after either
winning or losing on his individual claim in the district court. 578 F.2d at 1110. See, e.g.,
Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1977); Horn v. Associated Whole-
sale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977).
578 F.2d at 1110-11.
Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 995 n.10 (5th Cir. 1978).
578 F.2d at 1111.
"Id.
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The Roper court recognized that unnamed putative class members
could intervene6 to secure the review of the denial of certification. 2 Such
intervention, if proper, would be possible at any time during a class action,
even after a decision on the merits adverse to the named plaintiffs. 3 How-
ever, the protection afforded unnamed class members by allowing an inter-
vening class member to appeal is inadequate. Unnamed class members
have had no notice6" of the class action. Therefore, such intervention would
be largely fortuitous. The Roper court suggested that such intervenors
could be paid off as easily as named plaintiffs." So long as the defendants
tendered damages to a limited number of intervenors, the Winokur reason-
ing would effectively insulate the denial of certification from appellate
review.6
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides for intervention in actions by parties who have an
interest in the outcome and whose rights may not be adequately protected by the parties
already in the suit.
62 578 F.2d at 1111.
'3 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
" Notice of the action to class members is required by FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Where
the class has not been certified, however, no notice need be sent to class members.
11 578 F.2d at 1111. But see Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978). In
Goodman the named plaintiffs had lost their individual suits on the merits after class certifi-
cation was denied. The Fourth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to appeal the denial of certifica-
tion. The court held the denial improper as premature and remanded. But the named plain-
tiffs were forbidden to continue to represent the class on remand because the lower court
judgment against them on the merits was proper. The case was to remain open for a reasona-
ble time so that a proper plaintiff might intervene to prosecute the class action. Implicit in
the ruling was the provision that if no suitable plaintiff came forward, the case would eventu-
ally be dismissed. The court did not discuss the likelihood of such an intervention.
11 Several courts have stated that insulation of a district court decision from any appel-
late review is a factor compelling appellate court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Geraghty v. United
States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S.
March 6, 1979); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 562 F.2d 1034, 1034 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Swygert, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 559 F.2d 209, 218 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), affl'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
Insulation from appellate review occurs because other avenues of review have not been per-
mitted by the courts. A denial of certification is not appealable as a final order under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235,
1237, rehearing, 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976). For a time,
some denials were appealable as final orders under the "death knell" doctrine. Under this
doctrine, appellate review is permitted when a lower court order has the practical effect of
termininating litigation before final judgment. See, e.g., Kom v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1971) ("death knell" appeal of denial of class certification). See generally
Appellate Review, supra note 2, at 114. The "death knell" doctrine was abolished, however,
by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978). The Livesay
court also held that denial of class certification is not appealable as a collateral order. Id. at
469.
Allowing review of denials of certification under § 1291 probably would lead to § 1291
review of grants of certification. Thus, defendants would be presented with a delaying tactic
which outweighs the benefits derived from permitting § 1291 review of a denial of class
certification on the narrow justification of preventing buy-off. See Appellate Review, supra




The reasoning of the Roper decision prevents the buy-off of possible
class actions after an erroneous denial of certification. The policy consider-
ations advanced by the Roper court indicate that prevention of buy-off is.
the preferred result and that the existence of a live controversy satisfies
the case or controversy requirement. Furthermore, the undesirable result
in Winokur is based on erroneous application of precedents. Bradford and
Jacobs only prevent review of the merits of the case when class certification
is not raised on appeal. Sosna and Franks allow class actions to continue
after the individual claims of the named plaintiffs become moot. Sosna
allows review of the denial and relation back of certification. To prevent
the termination of proposed class actions where certification may have
been denied wrongly, circuit courts should hold the action not moot and
allow the class action to continue for the limited purpose of reviewing the
denial of class action certification. If the denial was erroneous, the circuit
court should vacate the dismissal, certify the class, and remand for litiga-
tion on the merits. Only when the denial of certification has been reviewed
and affirmed should the dismissal for mootness be upheld. If defendants
know the denial of certification can be reviewed, the incentive to buy off
legitimate class actions will be eliminated.
A different problem is presented when class action certification has not
been considered by the court prior to the tender of damages to the named
plaintiffs. A defendant may attempt to buy off the class action before the
district court has made a ruling on class certification."7 The sweeping lan-
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), district courts may permit interlocutory appeal of any
order entered before final judgment in the action. Section 1292(b) requires the court to find
that the order involves a controlling question of law. A district court confident of its ruling
on the denial of certification is unlikely to allow interlocutory appeal. But see Susman v.
Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977) (interlocutory appeal of denial of certification;
question of law involved adequacy of representation). Preventing buy-off is not one of the
grounds listed for granting interlocutory appeal.
The Supreme Court recently held that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970), which provides for
interlocutory appeal of denials of injunctions, does not apply when a class seeking injunctive
relief is denied class certification. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478
(1978) (Court rejected argument that denial of certification limits the injunctive relief ob-
tained). Thus a claim for injunctive relief joined with a claim for money damages would be
of no help in obtaining interlocutory review of the denial of certification.
Alternatively, notification of the putative class members would discourage defendants'
attempts to buy off. Such notification has been criticized as prejudicial to the rights of
defendants, who are endangered by the possibility of further vexations litigation and who are
sometimes required to pay the costs of notification. See Almond, supra note 2, at 313; note
67 infra. The denial of certification raises a strong presumption of no class action. The
defendant derives no benefit from this presumption if notification is required at the post-
denial stage.
The only remaining solution is review of the denial of certification after the dismissal
for mootness. Assuming that defendants will attempt to moot the case quickly after class
certification is denied, final review would be nearly as speedy as interlocutory review. Dis-
missal for mootness would ensue and an appeal could be taken immediately.
11 A related problem involving a precertification mooting of the plaintiff's claim arises
in the context-of a settlement acquiesced in or instigated by the named plaintiff. See generally
Almond, supra note 2, at 317. Courts have analyzed this problem in terms of Rule 23(e)'s
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guage of the Winokur decision68 appears to apply to cases in which moot-
ness occurs before a ruling on certification. The Seventh Circuit, however,
has recently limited that language"9 and held specifically that the Winokur
rule does not apply to mootness occurring before the trial court rules on
the certification issue. In Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.,7" the Sev-
enth Circuit held that such a tender of damages did not render the class
action moot and that the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the
motion to certify.7 '
The plaintiffs in Susman brought a class action charging a violation of
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission 2 in connection
with a sale of securities.7 3 After the plaintiff had moved for class action
requirement of notification of the proposed settlement of a certified class action to class
members. Relying on Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), many courts have required notification to putative class members of precertifica-
tion settlements on the basis that class action status is presumed until there has been an
adverse ruling. E.g., McArthur v. Southern Airways, 556 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1977);
Rotzenburg v. Neenah Joint School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Yaffe v.
Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See generally Almond, supra note 2,
at 317-21 (citing cases). Lack of notice raises a due process issue if a precertification settle-
ment affects the claims of the whole class. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (claims settled in such a way as to prejudice the future
rights of unnamed class members; notification required on due process grounds). Where the
settlement only affects the claims of the named plaintiff, however, notice is not necessary to
protect unnamed class members' rights. Moreover, requiring notice abuses innocent defen-
dants who may be exposed to greater liability through actual or threatened strike suits. A
strike suit is a suit which has a settlement value to the plaintiff completely disproportionate
to its chance of success on the merits. Securities Law Developments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
863, 885 n.9 (1977). The defendant, though perhaps innocent, would prefer to settle rather
than bear the expense and business disruption of proving his lack of liability. Almond, supra
note 2, at 304. The potential injury to defendants from notification outweighs any concern
for plaintiff's rights where other potential plaintiffs would not be bound by the precertifica-
tion settlement. Id. Recently the Fourth Circuit specifically adopted this rationale in not
requiring notice of a precertification settlement. See Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th
Cir. 1978).
Almond's argument is valid in the context of strike suits, innocent defendants, and
named plaintiffs eager to settle. The argument is less compelling where defendants wish to
escape classwide liability in cases where plaintiffs are not eager to settle but wish to litigate
the claims of the class. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978).
See also Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W.
3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271, rehearing
denied, 562 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
The buy-off of a class action claiming money damages is not likely to involve due process
problems because a buy-off in such a case has no effect on unnamed class members' claims.
The buy-off or settlement of the claims resolves only the defendant's possible liability to the
named plaintiff. Unnamed class members are not deprived of claims without their knowledge.
Notification to putative class members is, therefore, unnecessary in such a case.
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
e' Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 870.
71 Id.
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). See note 12 supra.
13 Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1977). The Susman district
court denied class certification on the ground that the named plaintiff could not adequately
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certification, 4 but before the court ruled on the motion, the defendant
tendered the claimed money damages to the named plaintiff. The plaintiff
refused to accept the tender. 5 The district court, relying on Winokur,
dismissed the action for mootness.76 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit re-
fused to apply the language of Winokur to a precertification mootness.
77
The court stated that a pending motion for certification would
"sufficiently, though provisionally" bring the interests of the unnamed
putative class members before the court so that the controversy between
their interests and those of the defendant would avoid "a mootness artifi-
cally created by the defendant. '7 The court held that, given the pending
motion for certification, tender of the named plaintiff's damages would not
moot the class action. The court then remanded for consideration of the
motion to certify the class action" and held the Sosna relation back excep-
represent the class because the attorney for the class was the named plaintiff's brother. Id.
at 89. Plaintiff sought and was granted interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970);
see note 66 supra. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of certification. 561 F.2d at 96.
The plaintiff obtained new counsel and moved again for class action certification. 587 F.2d
at 868.
71 Id. Commonly, the class action plaintiff moves for certification of the class action,
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) some time after filing the complaint. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 1720 at 540-41 (1977). See, e.g., Bradley v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, 512 F.2d 626,
627 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. School Bd. of Suffolk, 418 F. Supp. 639, 645 (E.D.
Va. 1976); Amswiss Int'l Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 663, 665 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Dorfman
v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Most federal courts have no time
limit within which this motion must be filed. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1840 at 547
(1977). Generally timeliness should be judged in light of all the facts of the case. Id. The
plaintiff's failure to move for certification of the class "bears strongly on the adequacy of the
representation." East Texas Motor Freight Systems v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
Commonly, the class action defendant will move to dismiss the class action allegations of the
complaint. 1 NEwBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1720 at 540-41 (1977). See, e.g., Winokur v. Bell
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,461 (N.D.
I1. 1972). On either motion, the issue decided is the same: whether a class action may
properly be maintained pursuant to Rule 23. See also 2-PAT 2 BENDER's FEDERAL PRACTICE
FoRMs No. 2306.1A and 2306.1B at 553.5(1)-(2) (1978) (forms of motion to certify class
action).
71 578 F.2d at 868.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 869.
78 Id.
71 Id. at 870. The Susman court noted that its decision conflicted with that of the Eighth
Circuit in Bradley v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City, 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975). 587 F.2d
at 870. In Bradley applicants for low income housing filed a class action which charged that
discrimination in rentals based on income level was a denial of equal protection. 512 F.2d at
627. The Housing Authority mooted the plaintiffs' claims by placing them in apartments. Id.
The court relied on Sosna and Jacobs to hold that the district court properly dismissed the
action at the precertification stage since the plaintiffs could no longer meet the case or
controversy requirement. Id. at 628. Subsequent changes in the law prevented any further
such abuses, id. at 627, so that the repetition/evasion standard had no application. Although
the Bradley decision appears inconsistent with Susman, several factors militated against
permitting the trial court in Bradley to rule on the issue of class certification after the claims
of the named plaintiffs had been mooted. First, after the plaintiffs had filed an appeal with
the Eighth Circuit, subsequent enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1437(c)(4)(A) (1976) corrected the
defect in the statute so that income discrimination of the kind alleged could no longer occur,
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tion8' applicable to the precertification tender. Despite the mooting of the
named plaintiff's claims, the certified class action would be allowed to
proceed under the Sosna-Franks rule.8"
In applying the Sosna exception allowing relation back of class certifi-
cation,m the Susman court recognized that a precertification tender of
damages could prevent adjudication of claims in the same way as would
mootness arising through passage of time. 4 A defendant who expeditiously
attempts a precertification buy-off may succeed in mooting the plaintiff's
claims before the district court has had time to consider certification. The
language of the Sosna exception, on its face, does not preclude the excep-
tion's direct application to the precertification tender. Courts have allowed
relation back when the district court has had insufficient time to consider
certification prior to mootness," as well as when the abuse complained of
could repeat itself, although the claims may not meet the stringent
"capable of repetition yet evading review" standard." The defendant who
would buy off named plaintiffs at the precertification stage would continue
to do so as other class actions were filed, thus forestalling indefinitely any
determination on the merits. 7 The district court could prevent this result
by making the certification determination after mootness and relating cer-
tification, if proper, back to the time of filing the complaint." The Susman
thus eliminating the "capable of repetition yet evading review" problem. Second, the amend-
ments to the statute would have required substantial amendments to the complaint to rede-
fine the purported class. 512 F.2d at 629. As a matter of simplicity, the court preferred to
permit unnamed putative class members to begin the action anew, rather than allowing the
named plaintiff to continue the action saddled with the problems of redefinition and moot-
ness. Id. Although this holding ignores the danger that unnamed class members, through
ignorance, might never bring these actions, see text accompanying notes 62-66 supra, that
danger is more than balanced by the fact that changes in the housing law would prevent such
abuses in the future.
587 F.2d at 868.
'4 See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
587 F.2d at 870.
'4Id. The Susman court noted that relation back in Sosna was intended to apply in
situations where mootness occurred with the natural passage of time. Id.
85 See, e.g., Basel v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (insufficient time for certifica-
tion by district court); Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 433 U.S. 914 (1977)
(district court delayed in making certification determination).
8s E.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979); Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). See note 26 supra.
Cf. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979) (court noted that unnamed class members who intervene
to appeal a denial of certification can be paid off in the same way as the named plaintiff).
Is In determining whether to rule on class certification after mootness, a court should
balance several factors including whether the defendant has acted affirmatively to cause the
mootness and whether the named plaintiff has done the same. One commentator suggests
that relation back of class certification should never be allowed in the case of a precertifica-
tion mootness. However, he relies heavily on Sosna and Gerstein in which mootness arose
through natural passage of time or by operation of law, situations in which neither plaintiff
nor defendant caused the mootness. No consideration is given to cases where mootness has
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court implied that the relation back doctrine is a product of the necessity
for a legal rule that will permit adjudication when factual situations
change rapidly." The court ruled that the trial court could refuse to dis-
miss for mootness until a certification decision could be made. If the class
were certifiable, certification could relate back to the time of filing under
the Sosna exception.10
Thus, the Susman decision suggests that the effect of the mootness
doctrine can be avoided by either of two theories, ,each giving the same
result. The district court could certify the class action after mootness of
the named plaintiff's claim and relate the certification back under Sosna
or delay ruling on mootness until after reaching a decision on certifica-
tion." Either theory allows the class action to continue under the Sosna-
been forced on the plaintiff by the defendant's actions. Comment, A Search for Principles of
Mootness in the Federal Courts, 54 TEx. L. Rav. 1289, 1328-31 (1976). Dismissal for moot-
ness may also be appropriate in the situation where both defendant and plaintiff have con-
tributed to mootness. See Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978). The Shelton
court held that a certification hearing was not necessary once a settlement was reached if
the rights of the unnamed putative class members were not prejudiced by the settlement.
Id. at 1314. The holding addresses the situation where both parties, named plaintiff and de-
fendant, seek to end the class action by settlement. See also Arriaza v. Crocket Nat'l Bank,
577 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. November 28, 1978). The
plaintiffs in Arriaza accepted a court approved settlement after class action certification was
denied. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal of the denial of certification as moot with
respect to the named plaintiffs. Id. See generally Almond, note 2 supra.
The case where the defendant seeks to end the action by precertification buy-off while
the plaintiff tries to press the class claims falls between these extremes. The simplest solution
may be to permit mootness which occurs naturally or through collusion but to prevent the
defendant from asserting a mootness he has created with a tender of damages designed to
avoid liability to the entire class. The Susman court noted that the defendant had artificially
created the mootness. 587 F.2d at 869. To avoid precertification dismissal for mootness, the
plaintiff should be required to show expeditious pursuit of class action certification, a willing-
ness to continue the action, and rejection of defendant's tender. The Susman court found
these requirements satisfied by limiting its holding to the "situation where a motion for
certification has been pursued with reasonable diligence." Id. at 871 n.4.
" Id. at 870. The Sosna court also stated that relation back "may depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case." 419 U.S. at 402 n.11. The Susman court recognized
and approved of the Sosna court's emphasis on examining the individual facts of each case.
587 F.2d at 870, citing Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm., 579 F.2d 238 (1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979), see notes 7, 33, & 45 supra; Kuahulu v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334 (1977), see note 7 supra. The Susman court applied
the relation back exception, arguing that "courts must have a reasonable opportunity to
consider and decide a motion for certification." 587 F.2d at 870.
"Id.
" The Susman court seems to prefer the simplicity of delaying a ruling on mootness until
after ruling on certification; Id. at 870. This sequence, certification followed by a finding of
mootness, would not necessitate relation back of certification since the action would be
certified before mootness officially arose. However, since the Susman court went to some
length to show how the relation back exception applied, the court must have attached some
importance to the relation back of the certification. This suggests that despite the sequence
of the findings of the cburt, mootness really arises at the time of the tender of -damages,
regardless of when the court rules on mootness. Thus, under the alternative sequence of
mootness followed by class certification which is related back, the result is the same and the
court can rule on the issues in the order presented.
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Franks rule that a certified class action may proceed despite the mootness
of the named plaintiff's claims.
The policy arguments for preserving class actions recognized by the
Roper court support even more strongly the result in Susman. At the
precertification stage, no adverse determination has been made on the
certification issue. Allowing defendants to buy off a class action before a
ruling on certification makes possible the buy-off of all class actions
brought solely for money damages.2 Such a result would mean the end of
the class action as an effective device for vindication of multiple small
claims. Every class action defendant would tender named plaintiff's dam-
ages and move for dismissal for mootness immediately upon learning that
a class action had been filed. No class action recovery would ever again be
achieved. The Susman decision prevents such a result.
A post mootness certification hearing does not prejudice severely the
defendant's rights, as would, for example, a requirement that the defen-
dant give precertification notice to class members." If the class is certified
by the district court after mootness, the defendant's argument that rela-
tion back of certification results in exposure to classwide liability is out-
weighed by the finding that a proper class exists which has claims against
the defendant. Thus, the solution to possible precertification buy-off is
district court determination of whether the class should be certified." As-
suming that Winokur is still good law after Susman,11 the Seventh Circuit
allows buy-off at the post-denial stage but not at the precertification stage
if a motion for certification is pending.
,2 See Winokur v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 562 F.2d 1034, 1034 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Swygert, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing). The Susman court quoted with approval
language from Roper which decries the possibility of buy-off and recognizes fiduciary duties
in the named plaintiff. 587 F.2d at 870-71, quoting 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th .Cir. 1978).
Although the Susman court did not discuss the direct conflict between Roper and the law of
the Seventh Circuit in Winokur, the court qualified its approval of the Roper language by
asserting that the Susman holding was limited to the precertification stage. 587 F.2d at 871
n.4. See note 94 infra.
" See note 67 supra.
' Whether Susman overrules Winokur by implication remains an open question. Both
decisions rely heavily on Sosna. The Susman court held that the case or controversy require-
ment was satisfied because the pending motion for certification "sufficiently, though provi-
sionally" brought the interests of the unnamed class members before the court to avoid a
finding of mootness. 587 F.2d at 869. The proviso is that certification must be held proper
when ruled upon. In Winokur, certification was ruled improper and whatever provisional
status the unnamed class members had was eliminated by that ruling. Thus, on the narrowest
grounds of each decision, Susman and Winokur proposed rules which are not inconsistent.
One cannot ignore, however, the Susman court's citation of Geraghty with approval.
Geraghty may be inconsistent with Winokur. Neither can one ignore the Susman court's
reliance on Roper, which is diametrically opposed to Winokur. The arguments advanced in
Susman would seem to support overruling Winokur. Why a pending motion for certification
is sufficient to bring the interests of the unnamed class members before the court while an
attempted appeal of a denial of class certification is not does not seem apparent. A Seventh
Circuit plaintiff faced with a post denial buy-off could quite justifiably argue from Susman
that Winokur should be overruled in favor of the rule in Roper.
" See note 94 supra.
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The Susman decision, however, does not prevent all precertification
buy-offs. The Susman court limited its holding to the case where a motion
for certification is pending but recognized that the same arguments could
support a similar holding at the pre-motion stage based on class action
allegations in the complaint." The Susman court recognized the require-
ment of Sosna that the interests of the unnamed class members must be
sufficiently before the court to raise a controversy. The Sosna court did not
elaborate on the conditions that must be met to satisfy this requirement.
The Susman court held that the timely filing and diligent pursuit of a
motion for class certification brought the interests of the class before the
court. 7 The implication is that the plaintiff's diligent prosecution of the
class action, in whatever form, would bring those interests sufficiently
before the court. Class action allegations in the complaint could be suffi-
cient where the defendant tenders damages before the plaintiff reasonably
could have moved for class action certification.
A buy-off will moot a claim for damages only if there is a tender of the
full amount of the damages. A defendant that offers less than the full
amount is not buying off but is negotiating for settlement. If the defendant
attempts to negotiate, and negotiations prove futile due to plaintiff's recal-
citrance, the court could still apply the relation back exception of Sosna
to a buy-off attempt that has been delayed by negotiations. The critical
issue in applying the exception is whether the buy-off attempt occurs
before the court has had time to consider class certification. However, if
the plaintiff agrees to negotiate a settlement, and therefore is partially
responsible for the delay, relation back would not be allowed." Failing to
move timely for certification is one example of delay caused by plaintiff.9
Thus, when the plaintiff is without fault, opposes the tender of damages,
and timely files a motion for certification, the district court could certify
the class after the mooting of named plaintiff's claims, regardless of
whether the plaintiff filed the motion for certification before or after the
tender.
Proponents of the fiduciary theory argue that even though the individ-
ual claim has been satisfied, the named plaintiff still has an interest in the
certification of the class.'0 The named plaintiff has a fiduciary duty to the
unnamed class members which arises when the plaintiff files the class
action.' One of the plaintiff's duties is to seek certification of the class.
This interest of the plaintiff should be a sufficient Article m controversy
to avoid mootness, apart from the interests of the unnamed class members
and the timing of the motion in relation to the tender.0 2 The Susman court
" 587 F.2d at 869 n.2.
Id. at 869.
'7 Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 995 n.10 (5th Cir. 1978).
SId.
101 See Roper v. Cogsurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979). See also text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
0I Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979).
I" If the named plaintiff fails to move for certification of the class within a reasonable
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quoted language from Roper which supports this fiduciary theory,'" but
did not rely on the theory. Even if the fiduciary theory is applied, the
plaintiff must be a member of the class at the time the class is certified.'
Relation back of class certification, therefore, is still necessary.
In neither the precertification nor the post-denial buy-off situation is
the case or controversy clause offended by allowing consideration or review
of the certification after the defendants have tendered damages to the
named plaintiffs. A strict application of the mootness doctrine would allow
defendants with actual liability to escape classwide liability. Numerous
small claims would go unredressed, and other class members would file
new class actions, thereby clogging the courts and creating judicial dise-
conomy. The promotion of the class action as a device to vindicate small
claims encourages courts to allow consideration or review of class certifica-
tion issues. Only when class action certification is denied and that denial
affirmed after full appellate review should the action be dismissed for
mootness of the named plaintiffs claim.
M. WAYNE RINGER
time and tender occurs, then the plaintiff should not be able to rely on the fiduciary theory
to avoid mootness. In failing to timely move for certification he has breached his fiduciary
duty before any mootness arose. See East Texas Motor Freight Systems v. Rodriguez, 431
U.S. 395, 405 (1977). Thus, the fiduciary theory gives the same result as the theory based on
the interests of the unnamed class members being sufficiently before the court. The class
action, then, can survive mootness if either a motion for certification is pending but the court
has had insufficient time to rule, or mootness occurs before the plaintiff has had a reasonable
time in which to move for certification.
'0= 587 F.2d at 870-71.
, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975). See East Texas Motor Freight Systems v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 355, 403 (1977).
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